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CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS:
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. By

Kennan L. Teslik. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1982. Pp.
ix, 280. $29.95.
If one were given a list that included Xerox Corporation, Paul
Newman and Disney's "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs," it
would be a challenge to identify the common element. The solution
is that these were among the two thousand entities that were blacklisted by the Arab League because they made a "material contribution" to Israel. 1 The boycott, which began even before Israel's
establishment as a state, divided the Middle East's trading partners
into those who trade with Arab countries and those who are blacklisted. For example, a person in an Arab country can drive a Chevy
from National Car Rental but not one from Hertz; in Saudi Arabia,
one can buy Pepsi but never Coke. In contrast to the erratic operation of the Arab boycott, Kennan Teslik's2 Congress, The Executive
Branch, and Special Interests presents a coherent narrative of the
calculated efforts to establish anti-boycott legislation in this country.3
Teslik's theme is that, through a unique combination of factors, the
anti-boycott legislation achieved the principal goals of the anti-boycott activists without seriously damaging America's growing interests
in the Arab world. In Teslik's book, the how and why of the 1977
Anti-Boycott Amendments to the Export Administration Act of
19694 are nicely placed in the context of domestic politics and international events.
The Arab oil embargo was the first major event that led to growing pressure for governmental action from many sectors in Israel and
the United States. The increased influence of the Arab countries
changed the world's perception of the boycott. What had once been
thought of as a "toothless and gutless" propaganda device was now
seen as a mechanism designed to attach strings to petrodollars in
order to force the West to diminish its links with Israel (p. 69). In1. "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" was included in the boycott because the Prince's
horse was named Samson.
2. The author received his Ph.D. from Oxford in 1981. He has worked as a private consultant and as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Treasury Department.
3. R. HOWE & s. TROTT, THE POWER PEDDLERS (1977) also contains an analysis of the
formulation of measures against the boycott. See also The Arab Boycott and the International
Response, 8 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 527 (1978) (entire issue devoted to the impact of the
legislation). For a book that advocates a response to the boycott and that was written before
the passage of the Anti-Boycott Amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1969, see D.
CHILL, THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL: ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND WORLD REACTION
(1976).
4. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (Supp. V 1981) (originally the
1977 Export Administration Amendments, terminated Sept. 30, 1979 without substantial
change).
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deed, Teslik attributes the Ford administration's failure to combat
the boycott to the fear that strong opposition would jeopardize the
nation's access to oil (p. 107). Nevertheless, Teslik overlooks the
connection between this dependence-compelled acquiescence and
the emerging public resentment of Arab policies.
The media fanned this growing apprehension about Arab power
into a call for action by publicizing the "shadow boycott." This selfenforced voluntary boycott of firms and persons thought to be undesirable to the Arabs resulted, to an unascertained degree, in discrimination against Jewish Americans. The Jewish lobby, and later the
Carter administration, emphasized the moral aspect of combatting
the boycott. The battle was characterized as a struggle that pitted
United States' sovereignty and the principle of nondiscrimination
against the evil of the oil countries and the greed of big business.
The Bank Scandal of 1975 added more force to the warnings of
Jewish organizations and aided their efforts to combat the boycott.
Certain banks, primarily in London and Paris, discovered that they
had been excluded from Eurobond underwriting because of Arab
pressure. The media reported the boycott's influence on investment
banking as a new development in Arab economic warfare, and congressional hearings were soon conducted to investigate the discriminatory aspects of the boycott. These hearings gave officials of Jewish
organizations an opportunity to express their concerns before Congress and the attendant press and shifted the focus of the controversy
from international events to the domestic political arena.
The .Ford administration had preferred quiet diplomacy to the
confrontation inherent in passing and implementing a new statute. It
believed that the potential costs of new legislation would include:
(1) injury to diplomatic efforts in the Middle East; (2) damage to
Arab-American trade; and (3) public hypocrisy, in light of the American proclivity to adopt politically-motivated trade controls. But
anti-boycott bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House
in 1975, and, by the time of President Carter's election, the tenor of
these bills made it clear that anti-boycott legislation in some form
would be approved by Congress. The Carter administration took a
more receptive stance than its predecessor by accepting the basic
thrust of congressional anti-boycott initiatives. Yet the administration largely settled for public statements of support; it did not formulate any specific policies.
Later events are what provided Teslik with the opportunity to
distinguish his discussion of the role that interest groups played in
the formation of this legislation from the increasing volume of literature on lobbyists. 5 In the face of the executive branch's near abdica5. See, e.g., R. HOWE & s. TROIT, supra note 3; N. ORNSTEIN & s. ELDER, INTEREST
GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING (1978). Lobbying is not, of course, a modem phe-
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tion of responsibility, representatives of American business and
Jewish organizations took responsibility for resolving the issue. Irving Shapiro of the Business Roundtable (BR) approached the leadership of the Anti-Defamation League (AOL) of B'nai B'rith, and
the partnership formed by that meeting negotiated and drafted the
Joint Statements of Principles, which ultimately became the 1977
Amendments to the Export Administration Act. President Carter
did little more than establish a climate receptive to the product of the
negotiations between the BR and the Jewish organizations, of which
the ADL was the most influential.
Teslik provides both background information about and an analysis of the roles of these private drafting groups. The Business
Roundtable was formed in 1972 and is composed of the chief executives of 170 major American corporations. The keys to its influence
are the direct participation of the chief executives and the use of
member corporate resources on an ad hoc basis. In drafting the legislation, the BR focused political tensions on itself and afforded the
executive branch the luxury of remaining in the background. The
Israeli lobby generally operates on three levels: the diplomatic activity of the government itself, the pro-Israel activities of American
Jewish organizations, and the sentiment of Jewish Americans. The
Anti-Defamation League is dedicated to eliminating anti-Jewish discrimination from American life and was BR's major partner in drafting the legislation. In a tactical move, the strongest Israeli lobby, the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), kept a low profile in order to portray the boycott as an American domestic
problem.
The measures formulated by these private groups were adopted
verbatim by Congress. The legislation is basically a prohibition on
taking action to comply with, further, or support a foreign boycott
including: (I) discriminating against a United States citizen because
of race, religion, sex, ethnic or national origin, and (2) furnishing
information about such characteristics or about a person's activities
with, or contributions to, a boycotted country. Teslik applauds the
legislation as a compromise from which everyone gained something.
The new law reconfirmed American support for Israel, and although
the majority of the business community would have preferred no
legislation at all, the final act was not a major impediment to ArabAmerican trade. Both the Carter administration and Congress
scored some points politically while avoiding an all-out
confrontation.
nomenon; Teslik notes that it is the world's second oldest profession: "'Who convinced Hannibal to buy all those elephants?' . . . 'Why did the Romans go in so heavily for road
construction? What is the Sphinx doing so far out in the desert?'" P. 245 (quoting the letter of
a New Hampshire assemblywoman to The Boston Globe).
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This alternative legislative path succeeded - at least insofar as it
satisfied the Jewish lobbyists and did not compromise American access to oil - due to a fortuitous union of factors. President Carter's
desire to avoid a major battle before the public initially opened the
way for the private interest groups. A number of committed and
influential individuals kept the process moving, and the participating
groups' recognition of the necessity for compromise paved the way
to a resolution of the issue. The quality of the substantive provisions
benefited from the internal capabilities of the BR and ADL as well
as from each group's ability to speak authoritatively for a community whose interests would be significantly affected. Teslik traces
this process nicely but fails to ask whether a combination of special
interest groups will ever again have the opportunity to formulate
American policy unilaterally. His general concern that powerful
lobbyists may distort public policy is far more compelling in this
type of situation, in which the traditional countervailing pressures
exerted by Congress and the Executive branch are absent. Still, the
reader is left to speculate on how - or even if - such a situation
will arise in the future.
Teslik's discomfort with the prominent role played by the Israeli
lobby in drafting the Amendments weakens his otherwise balanced
analysis, and his attempt to contrast the relative strength of the Israeli lobby with that of the Arab lobby is undermined by simplistic
statements. For instance, Teslik writes that "if a foreign government
wants favorable treatment in Washington there is nothing like a domestic mouthpiece with political clout. Israel has one. The Arabs
don't" (p. 46). But this statement is preceded by a discussion of Arab
nations' employment of well-connected Americans (including Clark
Clifford and William Fulbright) to look after Arab interests,6 and a
discussion of the growth of the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA). Teslik's oversimplification also ignores the prominent role played throughout the 1970's by companies such as
Aramco and Standard Oil as representatives of the Arab interests,'
and he further ignores the then-prevalent sympathetic image of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. The glaring imbalance of this
section leads the reader to question the accuracy of Teslik's other
portraits.
William Quandt once described foreign policymaking discouragingly as follows:
The process by which foreign decisions are made is complex and often
perplexing, not only to outside observers but also to the participants
6. On the influence of the Arab lobby generally, see A.K. GooTT & S. ROSEN, THE CAM·
H. LEVINS, ARAB REACH: THE SECRET WAR AGAINST

PAIGN TO DISCREDIT ISRAEL (1983);
ISRAEL (1983).

7. For a more critical discussion of Arab influence, see W.
ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (1977).

NELSON & T. PRITTIE, THE
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themselves. When this awkward process, dominated by bureaucratic
rivalries, the rhetoric of "national interest," and the pressures of interest groups, Congress, and the press, is applied to the formulation of
policy for the Middle East, the results are often particularly opaque. 8

In contrast and in spite of its weaknesses, Teslik's portrait of the formation of the anti-boycott legislation is clear and understandable.
His extensive use of congressional documents, news reports, and interviews with the debate's primary participants gives tremendous
depth to his narrative. Congress, the Executive Branch, and Special
Interests sho~d be read by anyone attempting to combat the
" 'peaceful, silent remedf " 9 of economic warfare; it must, however,
be read with a discerning eye.

8. P. 28 (footnote omitted) (quoting Quandt, l)omeslic Influences on United Stales Foreign
Policy in the Middle East: The View From Washington, in THE MIDDLE EAST: QUEST FOR AN
AMERICAN POLICY 263 (W. Beling ed. 1973)).
9. P. 19 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, speaking in 1919).

